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Abstract
We propose a novel approach to measuring the causal eﬀect of family structure
on a child’s outcomes. In a war, some fathers are killed in action and cannot
return to their families. This creates a natural experiment in which the eﬀects
of a father’s absence can be tested. Using data from the U.S. Civil War, we find
no evidence that a father’s death in the war aﬀected his child’s labor income as
a young adult. We also find no eﬀect on labor force participation or the chance
of being married in 1880. Daughters of fathers who died were less likely to be
students in 1880, although we find no such eﬀect on sons.
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1 Introduction
In 1960, 8% of children lived in female-headed families; in 2004, 23% did (U.S. Bureau of
the Census [77]).1 Children who grow up without a father present tend to leave school
earlier2 and to earn less income as young adults3. They also exhibit more behavioral
and psychological problems.4 Glaeser and Sacerdote [26] find that the most important
reason for higher crime in cities is the higher percentage of female headed families.
Why do children who grow up in female-headed families fare worse? One explanation
is causal. Fathers act as role models and teach moral values (Haveman and Wolfe [32]).
They help monitor children’s behavior (Seltzer [72]) and invest time and money in a
child’s education (Becker and Tomes [5]). They may also provide information, advice,
and access to social networks that help a child in the labor market (Barber [4]).
A second explanation is unobserved heterogeneity (Manski, McLanahan, Powers,
and Sandefur [44]). Positive traits such as intelligence, physical and mental health, and
responsible behavior make people more attractive and stable marriage partners. They
are also passed on to one’s children, via either heredity or parental behavior. This creates
a correlation between growing up with a father present and having good outcomes in
school and work, but it is not causal.
Which explanation is correct? The answer has implications for social policy. If
children benefit from having a father present, then we can improve children’s outcomes
1Willis [79] traces this trend to the increase in women’s incomes in recent decades.
2See Astone and McLanahan [3]; Biblarz and Gottainer [7]; Case and Katz [8]; Ermisch and
Francescone [16]; Manski, McLanahan, Powers, and Sandefur [44]; Peters and Mullis [62]; Ribar [66];
Sandefur, McLanahan, and Wojtkiewicz [68]; and Ver Ploeg [78].
3See Biblarz and Gottainer [7]; Corak [12]; Hill and Duncan [34]; Hill, Augustyniak, and Ponza [33];
Li and Wojtkiewicz [41]; McLanahan and Booth [47]; McLanahan and Sandefur [48]; and Powell and
Parcel [64].
4Children in female-headed families are more likely to have poor relationships with their parents, to
drop out of school, and to receive psychological help (Zill, Morrison, and Coiro [80]). They are also
more likely to smoke (Kirby [35]), to use drugs (Needle, Su, and Doherty [59]), and to give in to peer
pressure to steal, commit acts of vandalism, and cheat on examinations (Steinberg [74]).
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by trying to keep families together. If the only reason is unobserved heterogeneity, then
it would be better to focus on pregnancy prevention and education for disadvantaged
young women.
This paper uses the U.S. Civil War as a natural experiment to study this issue. Most
fathers survived the war and returned to their families. Others were less lucky. We
show that death from violence in the Civil War was a random event. Hence, it can be
used as a natural experiment to measure the causal eﬀect of father absence on a child’s
outcomes. Our results support the view that children of absent fathers do poorly in the
labor market because of unobserved heterogeneity. However, we do find evidence for a
negative eﬀect of a father’s death on a daughter’s educational attainment.
Others before us have used a father’s death to study the eﬀect of family structure
on children’s outcomes (see Biblarz and Gottainer [7]; Corak [12]; Gertler, Levine, and
Ames [25]; and Lang and Zagorsky [36]).5 However, as Corak [12] points out, premature
death is not necessarily random. For instance, high school dropouts have the highest
age-adjusted death rates–not only from disease, but also from homicide, suicide, and
accidents (National Center for Health Statistics [57]). In contrast, we will show that
violent death in the Civil War was truly random.
For our purposes, the Civil War has several advantages over modern wars. It was
the last major U.S. war in which large numbers of fathers fought and died. We will show
that these fathers came from a representative distribution of civilian jobs. In contrast,
as of World War I fathers have been exempt from conscription.6 Most fathers who
fought in the wars of the 20th century were career military oﬃcers. Military families
may have unique characteristics that make them less relevant to the general population.
In addition, 19th century data are less subject to privacy restrictions. Fathers who
survived the war often came home with disabilities that reduced their incomes, wealth,
5In addition, Lyle [43] uses military deployments to estimate the eﬀects of parental absence on
children’s test scores. He finds a slight negative eﬀect.
6Most fathers took advantage of this exemption. We studied two random samples of children who
were born just before one of the two World Wars. The fathers of these children were actually more
likely to die after the war than during it. (See Appendix A for more details.)
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and geographic mobility over subsequent decades (Costa [14], Lee [39, 40]). We are
able to control for this using information on each surviving recruit’s disabilities. Such
information is harder to obtain for more recent wars.
Our study design also lets us isolate the pure eﬀect of a father’s physical absence on
his children, uncontaminated by the psychological ill eﬀects that hinder children whose
absent fathers are still alive. A child whose mother is divorced, separated, or never-
married may have low self-esteem due to feelings of rejection by his absent father. This
is unlikely to be a problem for war orphans.7 Moreover, death in war lacks the social
stigma of divorce or illegitimacy.
Our study also abstracts, to a large extent, from the lost income that results from
a father’s absence. Civil War pensions replaced a nontrivial portion of the wages of a
live father that would have been available for his family’s consumption. In Appendix
B, we estimate that the typical father consumed about 27% of his family’s income.
The remaining 73% would have been available to other family members. Civil War
pensions did not replace all of this but they came close. The typical widow of a farm
laborer received a pension that replaced approximately 64% of her husband’s lost income
(Appendix B). For widows of nonfarm laborers the estimate is 49% and for widows of
white collar workers it is 46%.
For widows who remarried, the pension system provided overinsurance. Upon re-
marriage, a widow’s pension devolved to her children (Sanger [70, p. 230]). Hence,
for widows who retained custody of their children, household pension income would be
unaﬀected by remarriage, while the family would benefit from the new husband’s income.
Our findings are as follows. A father’s violent death has essentially no eﬀect on a
child’s labor market outcomes in 1880: it has no eﬀect on the chance that a child will
have a paying job or on the child’s income from such a job. This holds for both boys and
girls. A father’s death did aﬀect his child’s investment in human capital, but only for
girls: daughters of fathers who died violently were 1.3 to 1.5 percentage points less likely
7One may even think the opposite: that a father’s heroic death in war may inspire a child. However,
we find similar (non)eﬀects of father’s death on a child’s income whether the father died violently or
from disease, even though violent death would seem to be more heroic.
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to be students in 1880.8 These daughters appear to have had a higher chance of doing
unpaid housework, though the increase is not statistically significant. Father’s violent
death has no eﬀect on a son’s chance of being a student or doing unpaid housework in
1880.
A father’s death in the war did aﬀect a child’s family structure in 1880. Sons whose
fathers died were less likely to live with their mothers in 1880 but daughters were not.
A father’s death did not aﬀect his child’s chance of being married in 1880. However,
it did cause his married daughters to have 0.7 fewer children living with them in 1880.
We find no such fertility eﬀect on married sons.
Finally, a father’s violent death reduced the number of siblings aged 18 and under
living with a child in 1880. It had no significant imact on the number of siblings aged
19 and over living with the child. This appears to be a direct fertility eﬀect: dead
soldiers could not father any more children.
Most other studies have found that the correlation between family structure and
children’s outcomes is due wholly or in part to unobserved heterogeneity.9 A few have
found, instead, that the relationship is entirely causal.10 We find that a father’s violent
death does not aﬀect his child’s labor market outcomes or his son’s likelihood of being
a student in 1880. This goes against the causal explanation. On the other hand, a
father’s violent death lowers his daughter’s probability of being a student in 1880. This
lends support to a causal explanation of the correlation between family structure and a
child’s education in the case of daughters.
Other studies have also found a correlation between father absence and out-of-
wedlock childbirths. We are unable to study this issue with our data since having
8Overall, 9.7% of daughters in our sample were students in 1880. Thus, a father’s violent death
caused about a 13% to 16% fall in a daughter’s chance of being a student in 1880. The youngest
children in our sample were born in 1866, which would make them 14 years old in 1880. 4.7% of sons
were students in 1880.
9Examples include Biblarz and Gottainer [7]; Cherlin et al [9]; Corak [12]; Ermisch and Francescone
[16]; Lang and Zagorsky [36]; McLanahan and Booth [47]; Powell and Parcel [64]; and Ver Ploeg [78].
10See, e.g., Morrison and Cherlin [54]; Painter and Levine [60].
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a child out of wedlock was virtually unheard of in the 19th century.11 Because of
the vast changes in social norms respecting the family, our findings that sons leave the
home earlier and married daughters have fewer children may not be terribly relevant to
modern-day developed countries. However, they may be relevent to the eﬀects of father
absence in developing countries.
2 Data
This study uses data collected by the Early Indicators of Later Work Levels, Disease, and
Death project (henceforth EI), jointly sponsored by the National Institutes of Health,
the Center for Population Economics at the University of Chicago, and Brigham Young
University (Fogel [20, 21], Fogel et al [18], Costa [13]). The data consist of complete
samples of all 35,570 white men recruited into 303 randomly chosen companies in the
Union army. Union companies typically contained about 100 men, ranging from private
(the lowest rank) up to captain and also containing noncombat personnel such as cooks,
teamsters (wagon drivers), and musicians. Drury and Gibbons [15, p. 22] oﬀer the
following description:
An infantry company was commanded by a captain with a 1st lieutenant,
a 2nd lieutenant, a 1st sergeant, four sergeants, and eight corporals. ...
Companies were also supposed to include two musicians. In the noise and
smoke of a Civil War battlefield, oﬃcers and NCOs could shout themselves
hoarse and still fail to make themselves heard. The shrill notes of bugles and
fifes, and the rhythmic pounding of drums were useful because they could
pierce the din.
11Only 0.5% of never-married sons in our sample had any children in 1880, compared to 77% of
married sons. The figures for daughters are 0.6% and 76%, respectively.
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All Men Men With Occupation
10-14 0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
15 0.8% 3.3% 0.1%
16 1.8% 3.6% 2.2%
17 3.4% 3.2% 2.3%
18 11.7% 3.4% 2.8%
19 8.1% 3.1% 2.7%
20-24 30.4% 15.5% 15.4%
25-29 17.6% 14.2% 15.4%
30-34 11.0% 12.4% 13.7%
35-39 7.7% 10.3% 11.5%
40-44 5.9% 8.4% 9.3%
45-49 1.0% 6.5% 7.3%
50-54 0.2% 5.4% 6.0%
55-59 0.1% 3.5% 3.9%
60-64 0.0% 3.1% 3.4%
65+ 0.0% 4.2% 3.9%
MEAN AGE 25.7 33.9 35.3
Age Group
Recruits 
Found in 
1860 
Census
Northern White Men 
Aged 15+ in 1860 
Census
Figure 1: Age distributions of recruits (EI sample), Northern white men aged 15 and over
(IPUMS), and the subset of the latter group with occupations (IPUMS). Age of recruit is age
when first mustered into Union army. Age of other two groups is age in 1860.
2.1 Representativeness
Were Union army recruits representative of northern white males? Table 1 compares
the age distributions of the EI recruits with the age distribution of Northern white males
aged 15 and over in 1860.12 This table shows that the recruits were on average younger
and more likely to be between 18 and 29 years of age than the general population.
Tables 2 and 3 restrict to the 14,120 recruits who were located by Fogel et al [21] in
the 1860 Census. Table 2 shows the occupational distribution of recruits, all Northern
12The age of a recruit is the age at which he was mustered (inducted) into the army. The sample of
adult white Northern males comes from the IPUMS one percent sample of the 1860 Census (Ruggles
et al [67]). We define the North as those states that were not in the Confederacy, which consisted
of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Lousiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, and Virginia (Rhodes [65]).
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All Men Men With Occupation
Farmer 27.6% 21.3% 24.3%
Nonfarm Laborer 20.0% 10.8% 12.7%
Farm Worker 19.6% 15.1% 19.5%
Craft 14.4% 14.6% 16.6%
Operative 9.6% 9.3% 10.8%
Clerk 1.9% 0.6% 0.7%
Apprentice 1.6% 1.4% 1.9%
Professional 1.5% 2.3% 2.6%
Manager/Proprietor 1.5% 3.8% 4.1%
Service Worker 1.4% 1.3% 1.6%
Student 0.4% 0.7% 0.9%
Sales 0.3% 3.4% 4.2%
Retired/Disabled 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
Farm Foreman 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
No Occupation 0.0% 15.3% 0.0%
Occupation
Recruits 
Found in 
1860 
Census
Northern White Men 
Aged 15+ in 1860 
Census
Figure 2: Occupational distribution of recruits (EI sample), Northern white men aged 15 and
over (IPUMS sample), and the subset of the second group who report occupations in the 1860
Census. Both samples of Northern white men are weighted so that their age distribution
matches that of the recruits. Sample of recruits is limited to those found in the 1860 Census.
Recruits’ occupation is as coded in the 1860 Census.
adult white men, and the subset of the latter group who report occupations. Both sets
of northern white men are weighted so that their age distribution matches that of the
recruits. Recruits are more likely to have occupations and, conditional on having an
occupation, they are overrepresented in the categories of farmers and nonfarm laborers.
However, the diﬀerences are fairly small.13
13There are two sources for recruit’s occupation: the 1860 Census and the the recruit’s Military
Service Record. The principal diﬀerence between the two sources is that the Census distinguishes
between farmers and farm workers while the Military Service Record does not. Our main regressions
use occupation from the Military Service Record since data from the 1860 Census is available for only
about 40% of the recruits. However, Table 2 relies solely on a recruit’s 1860 Census record in order to
yield an occupational schema that is consistent with that of the comparison groups.
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Table 3 compares other characteristics. Compared with Northern adult white men
with occupations, recruits were less wealthy, both on a personal and household14 basis,
had slightly lower income and socioeconomic status15, and were more likely to be literate.
The reason recruits had less real and personal property seems to be the way men were
recruited (see, e.g., Geary [24]). Before 1863, Northern states were given recruitment
quotas by the Union government. They filled these quotas by paying bounties to young
men and their families. These bounties would have been less appealing to wealthy men.
In 1863, a national draft was instituted. Men could avoid service by paying $300 or by
hiring a substitute. Wealthy men would have been more able to take advantage of these
loopholes. The higher literacy and labor force participation rates of recruits could be
due to the exemption given to the physically and mentally handicapped (Geary [24]).
2.2 The Randomness of Death
Our experimental design assumes that death in the Civil War was random. In practice,
this was not true for certain types of death. Lee [38] shows that farmers were more likely
to die from disease than nonfarmers since they came from healthy rural environments
and thus lacked immunities. In this section we confirm Lee’s findings. On the other
hand, descriptions of Civil War combat suggest that violent death was more random:
When the skirmish line was halted and the main battle lines engaged, pre-
cision shooting was impossible. Indeed, it was considered a major achieve-
ment to impose any fire control on a regiment once it became locked in com-
bat with the enemy. ... while a regiment might manage to open a fight with
a well-timed volley, this was usually followed by an uncontrolled fusillade.
(Drury and Gibbons [15, p. 24])
14We follow Lee [38] in measuring financial well being for a household by total household wealth
divided by the number of adult male equivalents in the household. Adult male equivalency is based on
caloric intake in the 19th century, using the table from Fogel [19, p. 9]. For instance, a girl aged 5-9
consumed 2/3 the calories of an adult male, so she is regarded as 2/3 of an adult male equivalent.
15These variables are defined in Appendix C.
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All Men Men With Occupation
  Real 4.2 9.6 9.9
  Personal 2.0 5.5 5.7
  Total 6.2 15.1 15.6
Household Property per Adult Equivalent (2003 $000)
  Real 6.6 9.5 9.2
  Personal 2.6 4.7 4.6
  Total 9.2 14.2 13.8
Own Annual Income (Including Zeroes) (2003 $000)
14.2 13.2 15.4
Socioeconomic Index 15.1 16.3 18.9
Literacy Rate 96.3% 95.3% 95.1%
Characteristic
Recruits 
Found in 
1860 
Census
Northern White Men 
Aged 15+ in 1860 
Census
Own Property (2003 $000)
Figure 3: Other characteristics of recruits (EI sample restricted to those found in 1860
Census), Northern white men aged 15 and over in 1860 (IPUMS sample), and the subset
of the second group who report occupations in the 1860 Census. Both samples of
Northern white men are weighted so that their age distribution matches that of the
recruits. Recruits’ income is based on recruits’ occupation in 1860 Census.
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In this section we show that death from violent causes is orthogonal to all of our measures
of a recruit’s social background. This suggests that violent death is indeed random for
our purposes and can be used as a natural experiment.
The IE database includes more than one cause of death for some recruits. In this
case, we treat a death as violent if any of its causes were violent. For instance, if the
recruit died from a gunshot wound that later became infected, we treat this as a violent
death.
We begin with death from disease. Table 4 compares recruits who died from illness
with those who did not.16 Stark diﬀerences emerge between the two groups. Recruits
who died from illness are much more likely than other recruits to have been farmers
before the war. They had lower prewar incomes and socioeconomic status and higher
household wealth. They were also more likely to have been mustered as privates.
Indeed, the wartime death rate from disease was 9.5% for privates versus 6.2% among
nonprivates. This is because farmers, who were more disease-prone (Lee [38]), were also
more likely to be inducted at the lowest rank of private (Lee [37]; see also Appendix D).
Table 5 performs the same exercise in the case of violent death. Recruits who
died violently are very similar to those who did not. They have virtually the same
occupational distribution, prewar income, prewar socioeconomic index, and household
wealth per adult equivalent in 1860. They also have very similar ages when mustered,
chances of having been mustered as privates, and heights at enlistment.
We conclude that Lee [38] is correct that death from disease was predictable, but
that death from violence was essentially random. Accordingly, we focus primarily on
violent death.
2.3 Finding the Children
The EI dataset contains three source of information on the children of recruits: the 1860
and 1870 Censuses and the pension applications of veterans and widows. In order to
ensure comparable age distributions of orphans and nonorphans, we excluded children
16The latter group includes both recruits who died from violence and those who survived the war.
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No Yes
Occupational Distribution
Farmer/Farm Worker 47.9% 66.1%
Craft 18.3% 13.2%
Nonfarm Laborer 16.0% 11.8%
Operative 10.1% 4.9%
Clerk 2.7% 1.2%
Professional 2.1% 1.7%
Manager/Proprietor 1.0% 0.4%
Student 0.6% 0.3%
Sales 0.4% 0.2%
Own Annual Income (2003 $000) 15.1 13.7
Socioeconomic Index 17.4 16.0
Household Property per Adult Equivalent 
(2003 $000) 9.2 9.8
Muster Age 25.6 26.2
Percent whose Initial Rank was Private 87.4% 91.5%
Height in Inches at Enlistment 67.5 68.0
N 32076 3196
Recruit Characteristic Died from Illness?
Figure 4: Attributes of Civil War recruits by whether or not the recruit died from illness
during the war. Recruits who did not die from illness include both recruits who survived the
war and those who died violently during the war.
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No Yes
Occupational Distribution
Farmer/Farm Worker 49.5% 51.1%
Craft 17.7% 19.4%
Nonfarm Laborer 15.7% 13.1%
Operative 9.6% 9.7%
Clerk 2.6% 2.4%
Professional 2.1% 1.9%
Manager/Proprietor 0.9% 1.0%
Student 0.6% 0.4%
Sales 0.3% 0.5%
Own Annual Income (2003 $000) 15.0 14.9
Socioeconomic Index 17.3 17.1
Household Property per Adult 
Equivalent (2003 $000) 9.2 8.9
Muster Age 25.7 25.2
Percent whose Initial Rank was Private 87.8% 87.2%
Height in Inches at Enlistment 67.5 67.7
N 33365 1907
Recruit Characteristic Died from Violence?
Figure 5: Attributes of Civil War recruits by whether or not the recruit died from violence
during the war. Recruits who did not die from violence include both recruits who survived
the war and those who died from illness during the war.
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born after 1866.
Family relationships are not explicit in the 1860 and 1870 Censuses. They must be
inferred.17 Fogel et al give the following guidelines [21, p. 54]:
The head of each household is generally either the recruit himself, or else
first household member.... Which of these two is the head of the household
can be determined stochastically by age and last name. After the head of
the household, individuals are listed in the following order:
a) Spouse
b) Children
c) Other relatives
d) Nonrelatives (including boarders)
We deem a household member to be a child of the recruit if the following conditions
are both met:
• the first household member listed in the Census record, other than the recruit, is a
woman with the same last name as the recruit and who is not more than 12 years
older than the recruit (and thus cannot be the recruit’s mother);
• the child is at least 13 years younger than the recruit and shares the recruit’s last
name.
In all the cases we have inspected, this algorithm produces a wife who is close in age
to the recruit and children who are considerably (20+ years) younger. By construction,
they all share the recruit’s last name. The chance that we are misconstructing some
family relationships appears to be negligible.
Using these rules, we found we found 5,435 daughters and 5,631 sons in the 1860
Census. The EI dataset has only partial coverage of the 1870 Census; we found 1,013
daughters and 1,084 sons in this source. Finally, the pension forms produced 6,978
daughters and 7,143 sons.
17Pension records include only the recruit’s wife and children so no inference was needed.
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There were a total of 11,900 distinct daughters and 12,041 distinct sons in the three
sources.18 However, while the pension records mention the daughters’ later married
names, the 1860 and 1870 Census records do not. We need these names in order to
avoid selection bias at the next stage: when we search for the daughters in the 1880
Census. We therefore discarded daughters who were not mentioned in the pension
records.19 The final total was 6,978 daughters and 12,041 sons.
We then searched for each of the children in the 100% count of the 1880 census,
which was obtained from the North American Population Project and the Minnesota
Population Center [58].20 In order to avoid selection bias, we ignored information about
other household members in 1880. We required only that the following attributes of
the child be the same in 1880 as in the source data: the first name, the last name, the
birth year ±1, the birth state or birth country if foreign born, and the mother’s birth
state or country. First names were standardized using code provided by Joseph Ferrie.
For last names, we used the Double Metaphone algorithm (Phillips [63]) to convert the
last names to their phonetic equivalents and then matched on these. We then used
the Spedis algorithm (SAS Institute [71]) to eliminate pairs whose spelling was grossly
diﬀerent.21 For instance, for a child named Byer, the phonetic first stage might yield
matches to children named Bair and Beyer in 1880; the Spedis algorithm would then
tell us that the match to Beyer was the more likely.
Summary statistics are as follows. For 29% of girls and 32% of boys, we found
unique matches. Due to having common search keys, 36% of girls and 31% of boys
18The individual numbers do not add up to the respective totals as some children appeared in more
than one source.
19Both widows and surviving veterans were eligible for pensions so this does not necessarily lead to
selection bias. We check the existence of selection bias below.
20The 1880 Census was converted to electronic form by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints [10] in a project that lasted several decades.
21The Spedis algorithm yields a distance between two names that is determined by the number and
type of letter substitutions and transpositions that are needed to convert one name to the other (SAS
Institute [71, p. 827]).
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were matched to more than one person in 1880. Finally, 35% of girls and 38% of boys
were not located at all in 1880. Some of these may have died. Of children born in
1860, 19.7% died before reaching their first birthday and 28.1% died before reaching 10
years of age (Haines [28]). The Census undercount is also an issue: the 1880 Census
is thought to omit as much as 10% of the U.S. population (Minnesota Data Center
[53]). Finally, some of the children may have erred in reporting their birthplace or their
parents’ birthplaces, or their names may have been spelled very diﬀerently in the two
sources.22
The existence of matches to more than one person implies that our approach some-
times yields incorrect matches. One may worry that this could also happen when our
approach yields a unique match. That is, we may simply be matching to the wrong
people in 1880. If so, the resulting measurement error would tend to bias any eﬀect
of father’s death on a child’s outcomes in 1880 towards zero. In Appendix E, we show
that unique but incorrect matches are actually quite rare: when our approach locates
a unique person in 1880, it is indeed the person we seek at least about 88% of the time.
Consequently, this type of measurement error should not be a serious problem.
Characteristics of matched and unmatched children appear in Table 6. The universe
is the full set of children found in the 1860 and 1870 Censuses and the pension records.
The columns labeled Matched are the children for whom a unique match in 1880 was
found. The columns labelled Unmatched consist of the rest of the children.23 Overall,
22We would not find children if their names had a diﬀerent phonetic structure in 1880. However,
we do search for a child using his/her alternative surnames when these are known. For instance, the
pension records might record a daughter’s married name. In this case, we searched for females in
1880 who bore either the daughter’s married name or her maiden name. Or the pension records might
report a widow’s surname from a subsequent marriage. In this case, we would search for the child in
1880 using both the original surname and the mother’s new surname. In both cases, we used both
alternatives since the EI study does not specify marriage dates for widows or their daughters.
23For both sexes, the Unmatched group includes children with no match or multiple matches in 1880.
For girls, the Unmatched group also includes girls who were not present in the pension records and were
thus dropped from the sample before the search took place. We include these girls because selection
bias may have occurred at this earlier stage as well.
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the figures are very similar for matched and unmatched children. This suggests that
selection bias is not a problem.24
3 Results
3.1 Eﬀects on a Child’s Income
Table 7 shows the eﬀects of a father’s violent death on a son’s income in 1880. We
restrict to children with paying jobs; in the following section we study the eﬀects of a
father’s death on a child’s work status. In column 1, the universe is the set of all sons
with paying jobs. The dependent variable is the log of the son’s IPUMS income in 1880
(see Appendix C for a definition). Independent variables consist of a dummy variable
that equals one if and only if the father died violently in the war; the log of the father’s
prewar IPUMS income; child’s age and age squared in 1880; and dummy variables for
father’s initial military rank and company.25
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that controlling for father’s initial rank and company,
the elasticity of son’s income with respect to father’s income is 0.29. If we omit father’s
initial rank and company, this elasticity rises to 0.45 (results available on request). This
estimate of the intergenerational elasticity of earnings is within the range of estimates
from the literature, which have averaged about 0.4 (see Mazumder [46] for a review).
This lends additional credence to our matching procedure.
In the specification of column 1, a father’s violent death raises his son’s income by a
few percent. However, this eﬀect disappears when better controls for social background
24Table 6 does show that matched daughters were somewhat younger than unmatched daughters.
This may be because not all mothers recorded their married daughters’ new surnames on their pension
forms. Hence, we may be matching to more daughters who are unmarried in 1880. This may not
create bias, however. If the chance of a daughter’s married name being recorded is independent of
whether or not the father died violently in the war, then this would not aﬀect our results. This is likely
since pension eligibility did not depend on a daughter’s marital status.
25We omit the dummy variable for the miscellaneous rank. This rank consists primarily of cooks,
musicians, and teamsters.
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Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched
1 F Dishonorably Discharged 0.29% 0.44% 0.25% 0.38%
2 F Discharged due to Disability 19.5% 18.6% 16.9% 18.0%
3 F Died in War from Illness 11.2% 14.3% 14.2% 12.8%
4 F Died Violently in War 5.2% 6.5% 6.7% 6.6%
5 F Muster Age 33.9 34.2 32.0 34.6
6 F Muster Date 1863.3 1863.3 1863.4 1863.3
7 F Enlistment Term 2.48       2.48            2.41       2.48            
8 F Height at Enlistment 68.3 68.3 68.1 68.2
9 F Prewar Inc. (2003 Dollars) $14,689 $14,785 $14,708 $14,776
10 F Prewar SEI 16.9 17.0 17.2 17.0
12 Child Age in 1880 22.5 23.1 20.0 23.3
13 F Initially Infantry 94% 93% 95% 93%
14 F Initial Rank is Private 86% 87% 88% 86%
15 F Farm Sector Before War 57% 55% 57% 56%
16 N 3822 8219 2004 9896
$5,67811
SONS DAUGHTERS
F 1860 HH Assets Per Adult 
Equiv (2003 Dollars) $4,825$5,621 $4,997
Characteristic
Figure 6: Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Children. Unmatched daughters include
those who are excluded from the matching procedure because they do not appear in the widows’
pension records. Row 1 is the percent of children whose fathers were dishonorably discharged.
Row 2 is the percent of children whose fathers were discharged due to disability. Row 3 shows
the percent of children whose fathers died from illness during the war. Row 4 is the percent
of children whose fathers died from violent causes during the war. Row 5 is the average age
at which a child’s father was mustered into the military. Row 6 gives the mean muster date.
Row 7 gives the mean number of years that the father initially committed to serve in the
military. Row 8 gives the father’s height at enlistment in inches. Row 9 gives the father’s
annual IPUMS income from his prewar occupation, in 2003 dollars. Row 10 gives the father’s
prewar socioeconomic index (SEI). IPUMS income and SEI are defined in Appendix C. Row
11 gives household assets per adult equivalent in the father’s 1860 household in 2003 dollars
for fathers found in the 1860 Census. Row 12 gives the age the child would be in 1880. Row
13 is the percent of fathers who were initially assigned to the infantry. Row 14 is the percent
whose initial rank was private. Row 15 is the percent whose prewar occupation was in the
farm sector. The number of children in each group appears in row 16.
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Child Age in 1880
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F Total Disability Rating
F Grade 1 Disability Rating
F Grade 2 Disability Rating
F Grade 3 Disability Rating
LOG OF SON'S IPUMS INCOME
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE
DEPENDENT VARIABLE
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NO YES
Figure 7: Eﬀects of Father’s Death on Son’s Log Income in 1880 (OLS). Sample restricted to
sons with paying jobs. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the father level. Bold
with underline indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the
10% level.
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are introduced. One way to do this is to restrict to a more homogeneous group. Nearly
half of the sons had fathers who were farmers and were inducted as privates. We restrict
to this group in column 2. Father’s income is omitted since all fathers in this group
are assigned the same income by our schema. Here the eﬀect of father’s violent death
is now smaller and statistically insignificant.
In column 3, we use a diﬀerent approach, which does not sacrifice sample size. The
universe is again the set of all sons; however, father’s log income is replaced by dummy
variables for father’s 3-digit occupation. Once again the eﬀect of father’s violent death
is small and insignificant.
In column 5, instead of the log of the son’s IPUMS income, here we use the log of
the son’s Margo income. We again find no eﬀect of a father’s violent death on a son’s
income in 1880.
Column 4 shows that these results are robust to the addition of some potentially
important controls for the child’s home environment after the war.26 The eﬀects of
these new variables should be interpreted with caution as they may not represent ran-
dom events. The first control is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the father died from
illness during the war. The coeﬃcient on this variable is close to zero and insignificant,
implying that death from illness was also uncorrelated with a son’s income. The second
(respectively, third) new variable in column 4 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
father died from violence (respectively, illness) during the war and the mother remar-
ried.27 These two variables let us study whether orphans whose mothers remarried
26We have also checked the eﬀects of adding the other variables of Table 6: a dishonorable discharge
dummy, a dummy for discharge due to disability, father’s muster age, father’s muster date, father’s
height at enlistment, father’s prewar SEI, father’s 1860 household assets per adult equivalent, and a
dummy for father’s being initially assigned to the infantry. These variables do not appreciably change
the coeﬃcient on father’s violent death in any of our regressions. Results are available on request.
27Each remarried dummy equals 1 if and only if the father died from the given cause and the child’s
surname in 1880 matches the mother’s surname from a subsequent marriage. We use this definition
since the only information in IE about remarriage is the mother’s new surname. The date of remarriage
is not specified.
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fared better than orphans who remained fatherless. The point estimates suggest that
they did. This could be due to the increase in income that resulted from remarriage.
However, the estimates are not significant and, moreover, a mother’s remarriage might
not have been a random event.
Finally, we add four disability variables.28 These are based on disability ratings
received by surviving fathers prior to 1880. During this period, positive disability
ratings were given only for war-related disabilities (Linares [42]). The ratings were
determined by army surgeons who examined the veterans.
There were four categories of disability. Grade 1, the most severe form of disability,
was reserved for veterans who lost both eyes or both hands, or who required constant
personal care:
all persons ... who, while in the military or naval service and in line of
duty, shall have lost the sight of both eyes, or who shall have lost both hands,
or been permanently and totally disabled as to render them utterly helpless,
or so nearly so as to require the constant personal aid and attendance of
another person.... (Sanger [70, p. 56])
Grade-1 disabled veterans were granted a pension of $25 per month in 1866. This
pension rose to $31.25 in 1872, $50 in 1874, and $72 in 1878. A pension of $50 equals
the monthly wage of a white collar worker in 1860 and is about twice the wage of a
manual laborer at that time (see Appendix B).
The second highest grade was grade 2. This grade was granted to veterans who lost
both feet, or one hand and one foot, or who could perform no manual labor, but did not
require constant care:
all persons ... who, under like circumstance [i.e., during the war in the
line of duty], shall have lost both feet, or one hand and one foot, or been
totally and permanently disabled in the same, or otherwise so disabled as to
28These are derived from the Surgeons’ Certificates records in the EI database (Fogel et al [22]). For
a comprehensive history of the Civil War pension system, see Linares [42].
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be incapacitated for performing any manual labor, but not so much so as to
require constant personal aid and attention (Sanger [70, p. 56])
The grade-2 disabled received a monthly pension of $20 in 1866. This was raised to $24
in 1872 and then remained at that level until 1883. This pension was about equivalent
to the monthly wage of a manual laborer in 1860 (Appendix B).
The next grade, grade 3, applied to veterans who had lost a hand or a foot or the
equivalent:
all persons who, under like circumstances, shall have lost one hand or one
foot, or been totally and permanently disabled in the same, or otherwise so
disabled as to render their inability to perform manual labor equivalent to
the loss of a hand or a foot (Sanger [70, p. 56])
These veterans received a pension of $15 per month in 1866. This was increased to $18
in 1872 and then remained constant until 1883. This pension was less than the monthly
wage of a farm laborer in 1860, which was $21.55 (Appendix B).
Some veterans did not qualify for any of the three grades but were still impaired in
their ability to perform manual labor. For instance, due to wartime wounds, a veteran
might be unable to lift without great pain. These veterans were classified as Totally
Disabled (Linares [42]).29 Unlike graded disabilities, the pension for total disability
depended on the highest rank attained. Captains were granted $20 per month; first
lieutenants received $17; second lieutenants were paid $15; and all lower ranks were
given $8 (Sanger [69, p. 567]). These rates remained constant over the period of our
study (Linares [42]). These pensions were considerably less than the monthly wages
they were designed to replace (Appendix B).
29The definitions of total disability and grade-2 disability appear similar, as both refer to an inability
to perform manual labor. The diﬀerence appears to be that total disability refers only to hard physical
labor while grade-2 disability was interpreted as an inability to do any work whatsoever. For instance,
a veteran who could do no heavy lifting but who could work as a postal clerk would be assigned some
fraction of total disability. A veteran whose condition did not permit him to work at any type of job
would be classified as grade-2 disabled (Linares [42, n. 16]).
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Beginning in 1870, it was permitted to assign fractional grades of total disability
(Linares [42]). For instance, a surgeon might conclude that a veteran had lost half
of his capacity for manual labor as a result of his war wounds. The surgeon would
then assign a total disability rating of 0.5. This rating would entitle the veteran to $4
per month if he was a private, $7.5 if a 2nd lieutenant, and so on. Starting in 1872,
a surgeon could also assign a fraction of the third grade to a veteran whose disability
exceeded total disability but was less than equivalent to the loss of a hand or foot. This
change allowed surgeons to grant pensions of $10, $12, $14, or $16 per month (Linares
[42]).30 Fractions of first and second grade disabilities were not permitted.
Some veterans were examined multiple times by surgeons prior to 1880. This was
often in response to legal changes that established new, higher-paid categories of dis-
ability (Linares [42]). Another common reason was a decline in the recruit’s physical
condition. For instance, a recruit who had lost sight in one eye in the war might might
lose sight in the other several years later. Upon certification by an army surgeon, this
would qualify the veteran for a higher pension.
Our disability variables are defined as follows. grade-1 disability is a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 if, prior to 1880, a veteran was ever deemed to be grade-1 disabled.
Otherwise it is zero. grade-2 disability is defined analogously. Since grade 3 disabil-
ity ratings were sometimes granted as fractions, a veteran’s grade 3 disability variable
equals the average of the grade-3 disability ratings he received prior to 1880. Similarly,
a veteran’s total disability rating is defined as the average of all total disability ratings
he received prior to 1880. If a father never received a rating for a disability of a given
type, then his rating for this type of disability was set to zero. Fathers who died in the
war were assigned ratings of zero for all four types of disability.
The specification of column 4 in Table 7 includes these four disability variables. We
detect no eﬀect of a father’s grade-1 disability or total disability on a son’s income
30While total disability pensions depended on rank, grade 1, 2, and 3 pensions did not. Consequently,
the new fractional grade-3 ratings were less helpful to higher ranked veterans. For instance, an upgrade
from total disability to eight ninths of grade 3 would double a private’s pension from $8 per month to
$16 (8/9 of $18). It would not benefit a 1st lieutenant, who was already getting $17 per month.
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in 1880. The coeﬃcients on a father’s grade-2 and grade-3 disability are similar in
magnitude but only the latter is significant at the 10% level. The coeﬃcient of -0.167
translates into a 15.4% drop in a son’s income in 1880. Lee [39] finds disabled fathers
accumulated less wealth after the war. This finding suggests that they also invested
less in their children’s human capital.31 The noneﬀect of a father’s grade-1 disability on
a son’s income has two potential explanations. First, the grade-1 pension far exceeded
the lost income of the typical veteran. This may have allowed a veteran’s family to
maintain its investment in a child’s human capital. Second, we will see below that
a father’s grade-1 disability made a son much more likely to be engaged in unpaid
housework in 1880. A son with a lower market wage would have a lower opportunity
cost of caring for his father. Thus, there may be a selection eﬀect, since the sample in
Table 7 is restricted to sons with paying jobs.
Table 8 displays analogous regressions for daughters. As in Table 7, only daughters
with paying jobs in 1880 are included. The eﬀect of father’s violent death has a larger
point estimate than that for sons, but remains insignificant at the 5% level. The
negative coeﬃcients on father’s grade-2 and grade-3 disability suggest a negative eﬀect
on a daughter’s income, as in the case of sons, but they are not statistically significant.
3.2 Eﬀects on Work Status and Schooling
In this section we study the eﬀects of father’s violent death on the likelihood of his
child having a paying job, being a student, or doing unpaid housework in 1880. Many
daughters and a few sons have no recorded occupation in 1880. We classify these
children as engaging in unpaid housework. There are two reasons for this. First, Census
enumerators in 1880 were instructed not to record household chores as an occupation.32
31Parental investment in a child’s human capital was first studied by Becker and Tomes [5].
32The relevant passage in the 1880 instructions for census enumerators is as follows.
Women keeping house for their own families or for themselves, without any other
gainful occupation, will be entered as "keeping house." Grown daughters assisting them
will be reported without occupation. ... The inquiry as to occupation will not be asked
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of Father’s Death on Daughter’s Log Income in 1880 (OLS). Sample re-
stricted to daughters with paying jobs. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the
father level. Bold with underline indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates
significance at the 10% level.
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Second, the burden of housework was so great in the 19th century that any child who
was not in school or working would have been regarded as a ready source of help at
home.33 Historical accounts support this notion: older children who lived at home were
worked hard (Cliﬀord [11, pp. 15-16]).
3.2.1 Eﬀects on Working
Table 9 studies the eﬀect of a father’s violent death on his child’s probability of having
a paying job in 1880. Coeﬃcients shown are marginal eﬀects.34 Columns 1-4 pertain
to sons while results for daughters appear in columns 5-8. In this table and throughout
the rest of the paper we retain the regressors of columns 1-4 in Table 7. Overall, 80.5%
of sons and 16% of daughters had paying jobs in 1880 (Table 9, last row).
This table shows that a father’s violent death has no eﬀect on the likelihood that
a child of either sex has a paying job in 1880. In column 4, we find that a father’s
death from illness is positively associated with a son having a paying job in 1880. This
eﬀect must be interpreted with caution due to the fact that death from illness was not
a random event.
Column 8 shows that conditional on a father dying from illness, the widow’s remar-
riage decreased the chance that her daughter had a paying job in 1880 by 1.9 percentage
points. Negative coeﬃcients of about the same magnitude are observed for the other
three remarriage coeﬃcients but are not statistically significant (columns 4 and 8). It
may be that the positive income shock from remarriage made it less necessary for children
in respect to infants or children too young to take any part in production. Neither will
the doing of domestic errands or family chores out of school be considered an occupation.
(IPUMS [51])
33The average household required 58 hours per week to maintain in 1900, compared to just 18 hours
in 1975 (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu [27]).
34We use a probit specification. Each coeﬃcient represents the marginal eﬀect of a unit increase in
the given variable on the probability that the child has a paying job in 1880, evaluated at the means of
the other independent variables.
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to get paying jobs.
Column 8 shows that conditional on the father surviving, having a grade-1 disability
lowered his daughter’s probably of having a paying job by 12.4 percentage points (sig-
nificant at the 10% level). The corresponding coeﬃcient for sons (column 4) is about
the same but is insignificant. The grade-1 category consisted of veterans who could
not function without constant personal aid. Veterans in this class also received very
generous pensions (see above), so less outside income was needed to pay for the family’s
needs. A child in this situation would have had a strong incentive to stay at home to
help care for his or her father.
3.2.2 Eﬀects on Schooling
Table 10 studies the marginal eﬀect of a father’s death on a child’s probability of being
a student in 1880. The dependent variable equals 1 if the child is a student and zero
if he has a paying job or is helping at home. There are too few students in 1880 for
the estimations to converge with the specification of Table 9. For this reason, we used
23 dummy variables capturing father’s state of enlistment instead of the 303 company
dummies. There are also too few observations to restrict to farmer/private fathers, so
this specification is omitted.
Columns 1-3 indicate that a father’s death had no eﬀect on a son’s likelihood of being
a student in 1880. However, we do find a negative eﬀect on daughters in columns 4-6.
In the specification of column 4, a father’s violent death reduced a daughter’s probability
of being a student by 3.7 percentage points. The eﬀect falls to 1.7 points in column
5, where father’s income is replaced by father occupational dummies. In column 6,
where home environment covariates are added, the eﬀect falls to 1.3 percentage points
but remains significant. We also find that a surviving father’s grade-2 disability raised
his son’s chance of being a student in 1880 but had no eﬀect on daughters. The other
disability variables have no eﬀects on either sons or daughters.
The coeﬃcients on a father’s death from illness and a widow’s subsequent remarriage
(column 6) imply a negative correlation between a father’s death from illness and a
daughter’s chance of studying, but only if the mother remarried. Due to the endogeneity
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Figure 9: Marginal Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Child’s Probability of Having a Paying Job
in 1880 (Probit). Dependent variable is 1 if child has paying job; 0 if student or doing unpaid
housework. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects. Standard errors of these marginal eﬀects are in
parentheses. Bold with underline indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates
significance at the 10% level. Intercept included.
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Figure 10: Marginal Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Child’s Probability of Being a Student in
1880 (Probit). Dependent variable is 1 if child is a student; 0 if child has a paying job or is
doing unpaid housework. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects. Standard errors of these marginal
eﬀects are in parentheses. Bold with underline indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold
alone indicates significance at the 10% level. Intercept included.
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of death from illness and remarriage, this may not be a causal eﬀect.
3.2.3 Eﬀects on Unpaid Housework
In Table 11, we study the eﬀects of a father’s violent death on the likelihood that a child
is engaged in unpaid housework in 1880. About 7% of sons and 53% of daughters were
in this category (Table 11, last row). The eﬀect on sons is estimated to be about zero.
The point estimates for daughters suggest a positive eﬀect but are insignificant at the
10% level. A positive eﬀect would be consistent with findings from Tables 9 and 10.
These tables show that a father’s violent death caused a daughter to leave school but
did not raise the likelihood of her having a paying job. A daughter who was not in
school and did not have a paying job in 1880 is assumed to have been engaged in unpaid
housework. However, the eﬀect may be too small to detect in this sample.
The coeﬃcients on grade-1 and 2 disability in columns 4 and 8 are of opposite signs.35
They imply that a father’s grade-1 disability raised the chance that his child was doing
unpaid housework in 1880, while a less severe grade-2 disability lowered this chance.
Grade-1 disabled veterans required constant attention and care, which might explain
why their children were more likely to be helping out at home in 1880. Grade-2 disabled
fathers required less care and some might have been able to help out with chores at home,
freeing their children up to work or study. There may also be an income eﬀect: grade-1
veterans received a much higher pension than grade-2 veterans.
3.3 Eﬀects on Family Structure
We now consider the eﬀects of a father’s death on his child’s family structure in 1880.
We begin with the probability of being married (Table 12). About 28% of sons and 26%
of daughters in our sample were married in 1880 (bottom row). We detect no eﬀect of
a father’s violent death on a child’s chance of being married. The small standard errors
35The point estimates for daughters are large in relation to the eﬀects of a father’s disability on a
daughter having a paying job and being a student (Tables 9 and 10). However, the standard errors are
very large as well.
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Figure 11: Marginal Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Child’s Probability of Being Engaged in
Unpaid Housework in 1880 (Probit). Dependent variable is 1 if child is doing unpaid housework;
0 if child has a paying job or is a student. Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects. Standard errors
of these marginal eﬀects are in parentheses. Bold with underline indicates significance at the
5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the 10% level. Intercept included.
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indicate that this eﬀect is precisely estimated.
In contrast, a father’s grade-1 disability lowered his son’s chance of being married
by 6.8 percentage points (column 4). The coeﬃcients on the lower disability grades are
insignificant. This implies that a father’s disability caused his son to delay marriage,
but only if the disability was severe enough to require constant personal care. While
the eﬀect on daughters is smaller, it exists also for less disabled fathers: both a father’s
grade-1 and grade-2 disability lowered a daughters’ chance of being married by about 4
1/2 percentage points (column 8). This suggests that as a father became somewhat able
to care for himself, it was acceptable for a son to marry but daughters were expected to
stay home in order to care for the father’s remaining needs.
Table 13 studies the eﬀects of a father’s death on the number of children his son
or daughter has in 1880. The samples are restricted to married sons and daughters,36
both of whom had about 1.6 children on average. Column 4 shows that a father’s death
raised his son’s number of children by about one child per son, but only if the widowed
mother remarried. This may be an income eﬀect. Columns 5-8 shows quite diﬀerent
eﬀects for daughters. A father’s violent death caused his daughters who were married
in 1880 to have 0.7 fewer children, in the specifications of columns 7 and 8. Eﬀects
are smaller and insignificant for daughters of farmer/private fathers (column 2). In
contrast to sons, a widowed mother’s remarriage has no eﬀect on her daughter’s number
of children. The less severe disabilities (total and third grade) seem to have a positive
eﬀect on married children’s fertility but these results are mixed. We detect no eﬀect of
the more severe grade-1 and grade-2 disabilities.
We also find eﬀects on the likelihood that a child lived with his/her mother in 1880
(Table 14). The overall percentage of sons and daughters in the sample who lived with
their mothers in 1880 was 53% and 60%, respectively (bottom row). A father’s violent
death lowered the probability that his son lived with his mother by 8 to 14 percentage
points (columns 1-4). We find similar eﬀects of a father’s death from illness (column
4). A mother’s remarriage appears to remedy this eﬀect on her son, though statistically
36See footnote 11.
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Figure 12: Marginal Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Child’s Probability of being Married in 1880
(Probit). Dependent variable is 1 if child is married, 0 otherwise. Coeﬃcients are marginal
eﬀects. Standard errors of these marginal eﬀects are in parentheses. Bold with underline
indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the 10% level.
Intercept included.
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Figure 13: Eﬀect of Father’s Death on a Child’s Number of Children in 1880, Conditional on
the Child being Married in 1880 (OLS). Independent variable is child’s number of own children.
Standard errors in parentheses. Bold with underline indicates significance at the 5% level.
Bold alone indicates significance at the 10% level. Intercept included.
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these eﬀects are less significant. In contrast, for daughters the eﬀects of father’s death
and mother’s remarriage are much smaller and generally insignificant (columns 5-8). A
grade-1 disability (implying total helplessness) raised the chance that a son lived with
his mother by 46 percentage points in 1880 (column 4). The eﬀect on daughters was 30
percentage points. These large eﬀects reflect the great burden of care that such fathers
placed on their families, and may also be due to the generous pensions they received.37
Finally, we study the eﬀects of a father’s death on the number of siblings living with
his child in 1880. This is divided into two parts. Table 15 shows the eﬀects of a father’s
death on the number of siblings (of either gender) aged 18 and under living with the
son or daughter in 1880. Columns 1-4 pertain to sons of the recruit while columns
5-8 pertain to daughters. The results imply that an orphan who lived with his mother
in 1880 lived with about one fewer sibling aged 18 and under than a nonorphan who
lived with his mother in 1880. This holds regardless of the father’s cause of death.
Remarriage remedied this eﬀect, but only for sons whose fathers died violently. The
eﬀects of father’s disability are mixed and mainly insignificant.
Table 16 shows the analogous regressions for the number of siblings aged 19 and over
living with the child in 1880. Here we find a suggestion of a slight positive eﬀect of
father’s violent death, although only the coeﬃcient in column 4 is significant at the 5%
level. The contrast with Table 15 suggests that the eﬀects in that table are likely to be
fertility eﬀects: a surviving father was physically able to have more children after the
war, while a dead father could not. The eﬀects of father’s disability are not significant
at the 10% level.
4 Conclusions
The percentage of children living in female-headed families has risen considerably in
recent decades. These children fare worse in school, work, and life. Most studies find
that this is not entirely a causal eﬀect. These range from simple studies that find a
37Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers [6] find, similarly, that children are more likely to visit wealthy
parents. For a contrary view, see Perozek [61].
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Figure 14: Marginal Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Child’s Probability of Living with Mother
in 1880 (Probit). Dependent variable is 1 if child lives with mother, 0 otherwise. Coeﬃcients
are marginal eﬀects. Standard errors of these marginal eﬀects are in parentheses. Bold with
underline indicates significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the 10%
level. Intercept included.
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Figure 15: Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Number of Siblings Aged 18 and Under Living with a
Child in 1880, Conditional on the Child Living with his/her Mother and Not Being a Household
Head (OLS). Independent variable is number of siblings (of either gender) aged 18 and under
living with the child in 1880. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold with underline indicates
significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the 10% level. Intercept
included.
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Figure 16: Eﬀect of Father’s Death on Number of Siblings Aged 19 and Over Living with a
Child in 1880, Conditional on the Child Living with his/her Mother and Not Being a Household
Head (OLS). Independent variable is number of siblings (of either gender) aged 19 and over
living with the child in 1880. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold with underline indicates
significance at the 5% level. Bold alone indicates significance at the 10% level. Intercept
included.
38
smaller eﬀect of family structure when other family variables are taken into account, to
more sophisticated studies that use twins, parental death, or other devices to purge un-
observed heterogeneity. But the question remains controversial: some methodologically
sound studies do find support for a causal explanation.
A weakness of prior studies that have relied on parental death is that most deaths are
not random. Those with less education have higher death rates, not only from disease
but also from accidents, homicide, and suicide. This paper identifies a historical setting
in which death was truly random. Both historical sources and our own analysis indicate
that violent death in the U.S. Civil War was unrelated to any observable measure of a
recruit’s socioeconomic background. Hence, violent death in the Civil War can be used
as a natural experiment to study the eﬀects of father absence on children’s outcomes.
4.1 Labor Market Eﬀects
Our main result is that there is no evidence for a causal relationship between family
structure and a child’s labor market outcomes: a father’s violent death has no eﬀect
on a child’s income or chance of having a paying job as a young adult. We also find
no eﬀect on a son’s probability of being a student. We do find a negative eﬀect on a
daughter’s chance of studying. Finally, there is no eﬀect on the chance of a child being
engaged in unpaid housework.
In contrast, we find large eﬀects of a parent’s disability on these outcomes. Having
a father with a grade-2 or -3 (intermediate) level of disability lowered a son’s earnings,
conditional on working. We found no eﬀect on daughters’ earnings, but our sample
contains very few working daughters. We also find eﬀects on work status: a daughter
whose father had a grade-1 disability (requiring constant personal care) was much less
likely to have a paying job in 1880.
A father’s disability also aﬀects the likelihood of doing unpaid housework. Having
a father with a grade-1 disability made a son or daughter much more likely to be doing
unpaid housework in 1880. These fathers imposed a high personal care burden on their
families. They also received unusually generous pensions, which reduced the need for
outside income. In contrast, children of fathers with grade-2 disabilities (severe but not
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requiring constant personal care) were less likely to be helping out at home than children
of able fathers. Pensions for grade-2 disabilities were substantially less generous than
grade-1 pensions. This increased the need for outside income. Fathers with grade-2
disabilities also required less care and some may have been able to help with household
chores.
4.2 Family Structure Eﬀects
We also considered eﬀects on family structure. A father’s violent death has no eﬀect
on the chance that his son or daughter is married in 1880. A father’s violent death also
has no eﬀect on a married son’s number of children in 1880. However, it does lead a
married daughter to have fewer children in 1880.
A father’s violent death makes sons much less likely to live with their mothers in
1880. We detect no such eﬀect on daughters. A father’s death also leads children who
live with their mothers to have about one fewer sibling aged 18 and under living in the
same household. There is no eﬀect on the number of siblings aged 19 and over living
with the child. This appears to be a direct fertility eﬀect: the father, being dead, could
not have additional children.
A father’s disability also aﬀected his child’s family structure. Having a father with a
grade-1 disability (requiring constant personal care) made sons less likely to be married
in 1880. The eﬀect on daughters is slightly weaker than for sons but extends to grade-
2 disability (the most severe disability that did not require constant personal care).
The eﬀects of a father’s disability on a married child’s fertility was mixed; there is a
suggestion of a large positive eﬀect for certain types of disability.
Having a father with a grade-1 disability made sons 45.8 percentage points more
likely to live with their mothers in 1880. The eﬀect on daughters was 30 percentage
points. These eﬀects are not present for less severe disabilities. Finally, a father’s
disability had no discernible eﬀect on the number of older or younger siblings living with
the child. However, our measures of disability are based on the loss of limbs or sight and
inability to work. These injuries may not be highly correlated with impaired fertility.
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A Other Data Sets
Before choosing to work with Civil War data, we checked two datasets that, at first
glance, seemed likely to contain large numbers of fathers who fought in 20th century
wars:
1. the 1972 Oxford Social Mobility Inquiry [29], a random sample of 10,309 British
men born between 1908 and 1952;
2. the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study [31], a random sample of 10,317 men and women
who graduated from Wisconsin high schools in 1957 (and thus were born around
1939).
The British data turned up very few men whose fathers died during the two world
wars. Of the 1,604 men who were born from 1908 to 1914, only nine had fathers who
died during World War I. Of the 1,553 men who were born from 1933 to 1939, only one
had a father who died during World War II. These numbers are even smaller than the
death rates that are observed after the wars. For example, 17 of the men born before
World War I had fathers who died in the four years after that war.
Similar results were obtained from the Wisconsin dataset.38 127 of the subjects had
fathers who died during the six years of World War II, while 156 of the subjects had
fathers who died during the six years following World War II. Once again, the death
rate during the war was lower than the rate after the war.
B The Civil War Pension System
The Civil War pension system is described by Linares [42]. Under the General Law of
July 14, 1862, widows of enlisted men received $8 per month (Sanger [69, pp. 566-7]).
Additional payments of $2 per month per child under 16, regardless of the dead soldier’s
rank, were added in 1866 (Sanger [70, p. 230]). An enlisted man’s widow with 2.85
children (which is the average number of children of recruits in our sample in 1860)
38I am grateful to Robert Hauser for providing these numbers.
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would thus have received $13.69 per month. Based on available evidence on caloric
intake in the 19th century, a father in such a family would have consumed about 27% of
the food in the family.39 Assuming that this percentage also applies to other household
spending, a pension that replaced 73% of the father’s earnings would constitute full
income insurance. Margo [45, Table 4.1] estimates that the average monthly wage of
northern farm (nonfarm) laborers in 1860 was $21.55 ($27.99). Thus, a pension of
$13.69 would have replaced 64% (49%) of the lost income of the typical widow of a
northern farm (nonfarm) laborer.
The replacement rate is slightly lower for widows of white collar workers. Margo
[45, Table 3A.12] finds average monthly wages for white collar workers of $49.59 in
the Northeast. Their widows’ pensions tended to be higher as well since white collar
workers were disproportionately likely to enter the army as oﬃcers (Appendix D). The
pension of an oﬃcer’s widow was $20, $17, or $15 per month, depending on whether
the deceased was a captain, 1st lieutenant, or 2nd lieutenant, respectively (Sanger [69,
p. 567]). A 1st lieutenant’s widow with 2.85 children would have received a monthly
pension of $22.70, which is 46% of the monthly income of the typical white collar worker
($49.59).
C Income and Status Variables
Income data were not collected in the decennial Census until 1940. The Census Bu-
reau asked for a respondent’s occupation instead. Hence, we must map occupations
into incomes. First, each occupational string found in our study is assigned a 3-digit
occupational code from 1950 Census Bureau classification system [75].40
39This is based on caloric intake by age and sex in the 19th century, using the table from Fogel [19,
p. 9].
40The North American Population Project (NAPP) has mapped each of about 1/2 million ASCII
occupational descriptions found in the 1880 census to 1950 occupational codes. We use this map. We
also manually coded a handful of occupational strings in both the 1860 Census and the Military Service
Records that do not appear in the the 1880 Census and thus are not in the NAPP map.
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The next step is to map these 3-digit occupational codes into incomes. We use two
methods: an approach that was used by the Minnesota Data Center in the IPUMS
project [50] and an alternative method based on research of Robert Margo [45].
The IPUMS method relies on median incomes by occupation and sex from a special
report of the Census Bureau [76] derived from the 1950 Census. Using this report, each
person in our study is assigned the median income in 1950 of persons sharing his/her
3-digit occupational code and sex. This departs slightly from the IPUMS approach,
which is to assign the average of the male and female incomes.41 These 1950 incomes
are then scaled to 2003 dollars using the increase in the consumer price index. The
IPUMS method has the advantage that distinct incomes are available for all 280 3-digit
occupational categories. Its drawback is that relative incomes may have changed from
1860 to 1950.
The second method uses 1860 wages for nine broadly defined occupations fromMargo
[45]. These annual wages, inflated to 2003 dollars, appear in Table 17. Here a person’s
income depends on his or her 1-digit 1950 occupational code, with exceptions noted in
the table. The advantage of this method is that it is based on actual 1860 wages. Its
disadvantage is its small number of categories, which necessitate a considerable loss of
detail.
Our study also uses information on socioeconomic status. We use the map from 1950
occupation to socioeconomic status (SEI) that is provided by IPUMS. The construction
of this map is explained in the IPUMS-USA data dictionary:
The SEI, which is based on the 1950 occupational classification system, is
a measure of occupational status based upon the income level and educational
attainment associated with each occupation in 1950. The score was derived
by using median income and education levels for men in 1950 to predict
prestige assessments from a 1947 survey (of a select group of occupations).
41The Census report omits median incomes for women in some occupations 1950 due to insuﬃcient
numbers. For these occupations, we impute a woman’s income as the median income of males in the
given occupation, multiplied by the ratio of the average female income to the average male income for
those occupations for which both male and female median incomes are reported.
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1860 
Dollars
2003 
Dollars
0-99 Professional/Technical $1,067 $21,587
100-199 and 810 Farm Owners/Managers/Foremen $524 $10,609
200-299 Manager/Official/Proprietor $1,067 $21,587
300-399 Clerical $652 $13,195
400-499 Sales $652 $13,195
500-599 Crafts $535 $10,836
600-615 Apprentices $345 $6,987
620-699 Operatives $535 $10,836
700-799 Service $629 $12,731
820-840 Farm Workers $273 $5,533
910-970 Nonfarm Laborers $328 $6,640
975 Occupation Unknown Missing Missing
980-995 No Occupation $0 $0
1950 Census 
Occupation Code Occupational Group
Margo Income
Figure 17: Occupational categories from Margo [45] and their annualized wages in 1860 and
2003 dollars.
The resulting statistical model was used to generate scores for the entire
range of 1950 occupations. See O. D. Duncan, ”A Socioeconomic Index for
All Occupations,” in A. Reiss et al., Occupations and Social Status (Free
Press, 1961). (Minnesota Data Center [52])
D Determinants of Initial Rank
This section presents evidence on the relation between socioeconomic background and
initial rank. Table 18 presents characteristics of recruits broken down by initial rank.42
Men who were older, taller, of higher income and wealth, and of higher status were
assigned to higher initial ranks. The top ranks tended to be professionals, man-
ager/proprietors, or skilled manual workers (crafts). The middle ranks were dispro-
portionately semiskilled manual workers (operatives) while the lower ranks were dispro-
portionately farmers and unskilled nonfarm workers before the war. The determinants
of initial rank were previously studied by Lee [37], who reached similar conclusions.
42The ranks in descending order in the IE database are captain, lieutenant, sergeant, corporal, and
private. Miscellaneous is a catch-all category that includes cooks, teamsters, musicians, and so on.
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Characteristic Captain Lieutenant Sergeant Corporal Private Misc.
Muster Age 32.5 29.5 27.8 26.3 25.6 25.1
Age-Adjusted Height 1.019 1.020 1.014 1.011 0.999 0.995
IPUMS Income (2003 $000) $25.6 $20.9 $17.6 $15.6 $14.8 $15.7
Margo Income (2003 $000) $8.8 $8.2 $7.7 $7.4 $7.1 $7.1
Hhld Assets per Adult Equiv. 
(2003 $000) $14.3 $18.7 $11.2 $12.5 $8.9 $8.8
Socioeconomic Index 44.6 34.8 24.5 19.6 16.8 18.6
Occupational Distribution
Professional 22.8% 15.2% 6.4% 3.4% 1.7% 3.7%
Manager/Proprietor 22.8% 9.1% 3.2% 1.0% 0.7% 1.4%
Craft 22.8% 23.5% 25.3% 24.0% 17.2% 20.2%
Farmer 17.5% 28.8% 36.8% 47.0% 50.5% 41.0%
Operative 1.8% 6.8% 11.9% 11.1% 9.5% 10.5%
Nonfarm Laborer 3.5% 3.0% 5.4% 6.7% 16.2% 16.9%
N 59 134 794 1263 31202 2118
Figure 18: Characteristics of Recruit by Initial Rank.
E Reliability of Matching Algorithm
Section 2.3 presents our main matching algorithm, which uses only information about
the child we seek. We will call this the "Child Approach". In this appendix we
present evidence that the Child Approach is right at least about 88% of the time. This
evidence comes from comparing results of the Child Approach to results from an a
diﬀerent matching algorithm, the "Household Approach".
The Household Approach uses information about other household members in order
to identify the child. We treat a child found in 1880 as a match if (a) his/her name,
birthplace, and birthyear (±1 year) match and (b) the household contains at least one
other person who lived with the child in 1860/70 census or who is mentioned as a
family member in the EI pension records. These other household members are also
identified using the same method as the child: name, birthplace, and birth year ±1.
To avoid making this approach too stringent, we drop two requirements.43 First, we no
longer use the Spedis algorithm to match the spelling of the last names. (We still use
the Double Metaphone algorithm to ensure a phonetic match.) Spellings in the 19th
43These requirements are dropped for both the child and the child’s household members.
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century were far from standardized and, as a result, gross misspellings by Census takers
were common. Second, we drop the requirement that the mother’s birth place matches.
A close inspection of Census records in 1880 indicates that children are often confused
about where their mother was born. We found many cases in which the birth place a
child reports in 1880 for her mother is diﬀerent from what her mother said in 1860 or
1870. Often the child believed erroneously that her mother was born where the child
or the mother grew up.
The results of the Household Approach are as follows: 26% of girls and 25% of boys
were matched uniquely; only 3% of girls and 3% of boys were matched with duplication;
and 71% of girls and 72% of boys were not located in 1880. The main diﬀerence from
the Child Approach is that there are fewer multiple matches and more nonmatches. The
percentage of unique matches is about the same under the two approaches.
Statistics for matched and unmatched children appear in Table 19. The proportion
of children whose fathers died is much lower for children who are successfully matched.
This is partly because fathers are used to match children; hence, those whose fathers
died were less likely to be found in 1880. A more serious problem is that the Household
Approach is biased towards finding children who have not yet left home. Accordingly,
matched children are much (4 to 5 years) younger than unmatched children. In addition,
leaving home may be correlated with labor market success. Because of these findings,
we cannot use the Household Approach to study the eﬀects of father absence on either
work outcomes or family structure.
While the Household Approach cannot be used to study the questions of interest, it
can be used to check how often the Child Approach yields false matches. To see how,
let us first restrict to the set of children who are matched uniquely by both approaches.
There are 2,398 children in this category. For 2,116 (88.2%) of these children, the two
approaches agree: they identify the same person in 1880. We can safely assume that the
Child Approach is right in these cases, since it is confirmed by the Household Approach.
In 282 (11.8%) of the cases, the two approaches disagree: they identify two diﬀerent
people in 1880. For these cases, the worst assumption for the Child Approach is that
it’s always wrong. But even with this worst-case assumption, the Child Approach is
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Matched Unmatched Matched Unmatched
1 F Dishonorably Discharged 0.14% 0.47% 0.11% 0.41%
2 F Discharged due to Disability 18.0% 19.2% 16.9% 18.0%
3 F Died in War from Illness 8.1% 15.0% 8.1% 14.0%
4 F Died Violently in War 4.5% 6.6% 5.2% 6.9%
5 F Muster Age 32.2 34.8 30.9 34.7
6 F Muster Date 1863.5 1863.3 1863.6 1863.3
7 F Enlistment Term 2.36       2.51            2.27       2.50            
8 F Height at Enlistment 68.3 68.3 68.2 68.2
9 F Prewar Inc. (2003 Dollars) $14,598 $14,805 $14,638 $14,788
10 F Prewar SEI 16.9 17.0 17.2 17.0
12 Child Age in 1880 20.0 23.8 18.4 23.6
13 F Initially Infantry 93% 94% 94% 93%
14 F Initial Rank is Private 86% 87% 87% 87%
15 F Farm Sector Before War 56% 55% 57% 56%
16 N 2953 9088 1824 10076
$6,37111
SONS DAUGHTERS
F 1860 HH Assets Per Adult 
Equiv (2003 Dollars) $4,868$5,788 $4,908
Characteristic
Figure 19: Household Approach: Characteristics of Matched and Unmatched Children. Un-
matched daughters include those who are excluded from the matching procedure because they
lack pension records. Variables are defined in Table 6.
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right 2116/2398 = 88.2% of the time for these children (those for whom both approaches
yield unique matches).
Now consider those children for whom the Child Approach yields a unique match but
the Household Approach does not. Is the Child Approach right at least around 88% for
these children as well? It should be. For nearly all of these children, the Household
Approach must yield no matches, since it very rarely yields multiple matches. Why
doesn’t the Household Approach yield a match in these cases? It can’t be because the
child’s own information doesn’t match: the Household Approach imposes less stringent
requirements on this information than the Child Approach does – and by assumption,
the Child Approach yields a unique match. Rather, it must be because in 1880 the child
is not living with anyone listed as a household member in the source data (the 1860/70
Census and the pension records). So the 88% extrapolates if the chance of a false match
under the Child Approach is independent of the presence or absence of other household
members in 1880. This seems likely: the false matches of the Child Approach are due
to having common names, which would seem to be unrelated to the presence of other
household members.
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